Gaza 2050: A Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and State Building
A realistic plan that can force President Biden’s hand
Current US presidential politics presents the American public and the governments of Middle East countries with an opportunity to seize the initiative in the Gaza crisis.
American politics is starting to resemble 1968, when anti-war disorder propelled Republicans to victory. President Biden and his opponent are statistically tied in the polls, and he is on the horns of a dilemma. If he is perceived as disfavoring Israel he will incur the ire of the powerful Israel lobby, which could sink his reelection. But if he continues to facilitate Israel’s war he will lose the youth votes he also needs to win.
President Biden has a strong incentive to find an escape route, therefore, and opponents of Israel’s war are in a strong position to make him take it. Here’s how:
My collaborators and I wrote a meticulous reconstruction plan for Gaza that promotes peaceful coexistence, and assures both Israel’s long-term security and a prosperous Palestinian state. If it captures the imagination of the American public, it will split the Israel lobby and make it politically possible — and imperative — for President Biden to compel Israel to end its war, allow aid in, and accept the Palestinian state.
Additionally, we prepared a strategy document that provides ideas for how to conduct a campaign that will accomplish this goal.
The current U.S. political dynamic presents a window of opportunity that will close on 5 November.
The following text is excerpted from this peace plan. I have been circulating it to Middle East governments and civil society organizations with an interest in the crisis in Gaza.
Executive Summary of the plan
This proposal contains a plan for a viable and prosperous Palestinian state. It addresses the interests of all important stakeholders, and contains a viable and enforceable security roadmap, thus providing Israel the assurance it requires to allow the creation of a peaceful, prosperous, and secure Gaza and Palestinian state. As a realistic ‘day after’ plan it has potential to inspire and excite receptive publics in Palestine, the US, and Israel, thus producing popular pressure for adoption and resulting pressure on governments to make it happen.
The plan both protects and incentivizes stakeholders. It encourages Israel and Hamas in the short term to cautiously disengage from conflict while maintaining vigilance, allowing for progress that benefits both sides. To alleviate Israeli fears of Palestinians and their future Palestinian state, it incentivizes Hamas to demobilize and compete peacefully for political power. The incentives include guarantees that the plan will go forward, that there will be a genuine Palestinian state, and the political and financial support will be sufficient to put Palestine on a path to prosperity and self-determination.
Most peace proposals are succinct, not much more than an outline, leaving the intricate details for future negotiations among diplomats. Because public enthusiasm for the plan’s vision is crucial for moving governments to endorse the plan, the plan meticulously works out crucial specifics. These specifics both educate the public and provide a foundation and framework for further negotiations on the devilish details.
The specifics include the following:
· Gaza and the West Bank are constituted as separate provinces under a federal government, to loosen problem linkages and to attenuate destructive competition between political parties;
· It flips the Palestine cosmology, making Gaza the beginning situs for the state, while proposing means and methods to build Palestinian state authority in the West Bank, even in the face of Israeli opposition;
· West Bank progress is de-linked from Gaza progress, thereby eliminating Israel’s effective veto of a Palestinian state;
· It proposes strong interim security arrangements and transitions in long-term security arrangements;
· It establishes a transition authority overseeing a reconstruction authority, both overseen by a coalition of sponsoring countries;
· It proposes ways to develop Palestinian government legitimacy and the means to safely hand off authority to local political bodies;
· It lays out details of the planning required, and the costs of reconstruction
· It analyzes many of the challenges facing the parties.
The Campaign for American Hearts and Minds
The American presidential race at this moment is almost precisely balanced, and President Biden fears taking actions that might put him on the wrong side of the Israel lobby, which could cost him the election. Yet by temporizing he is losing voters who find his enabling Israel abhorrent.
Vigorous promotion of a reconstruction and state-building plan that resonates with US voters, including Israel’s supporters, may immunize Biden from unified pro-Israel attacks, freeing him to compel Israel to end its assault, allowing him to win back the pro-Palestine voters he is hemorrhaging.
The plan outlined below is designed to inspire and excite receptive publics in Palestine, the US, and Israel. It involves collaboration with Palestinians to transform Gaza into the financial and commercial center of Palestine, an Arab Barcelona on the Eastern Mediterranean and a metropole on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. A viable and enforceable security roadmap will produce the space required to create a peaceful, prosperous, and secure Gaza, thereby ensuring the security of both Israel and Palestine.
To excite the American public, as well as to achieve these ends, sponsors of this plan will have to commit to substantial investment in basic infrastructure, population support, and key security projects. Making a public commitment to funding the plan at the time of its announcement will demonstrate that the coalition partners are not engaging in mere political talk but truly intend to see the plan through.
The security measures built into the plan and that ensure long-term Israeli security will appeal to influential American Jews and other supporters of Israel, thus earning their endorsements and creating a rationale for President Biden to engage in “tough love” and force an end to Israel’s assault.
Security Measures that Escape the Past
From its inception, Israel has pursued a ‘hard’ peace, relying on military action to contain Palestinians and its neighbors, leaving underlying grievances unresolved. This approach has proven insufficient in guaranteeing Israeli security, as evidenced by the events of October 7.
This proposal presents an alternative ‘soft peace’ security paradigm, drawing lessons from the postwar occupations of Japan and Germany.[1] It advocates for both sides to work towards creating and maintaining peaceful relations, reducing immediate threats of violence and eliminating them in the medium term.
A realistic plan for peace, security, and the potential for prosperity will unite Palestinians in pursuit of the common goal of rebuilding and establishing a peaceful, stable Palestinian state. This will reduce support for violent liberation and promote peaceful political competition among militant groups, reducing dramatically the risk of violent attacks on Israel.
The plan encourages Israel and Hamas in the short term to cautiously disengage from conflict while keeping up their guard, allowing for progress that benefits both sides. To alleviate Israeli fears of Palestinians and their future Palestinian state, Israel must see concrete actions that allay their concerns. The coalition will have to obtain Hamas’ agreement that it will recognize Israel’s right to exist, that it de-mobilize its troops and warehouse its arms, and cease its threatening activities on condition that the plan goes ahead. If the establishment of a Palestinian state is Hamas’ ultimate goal, and the displacement of Israel is seen as a means to that end, then a credible promise of a route to a widely accepted Palestinian state should be enough to persuade them to do so.
There are many historical examples of success in this regard. The IRA in Northern Ireland, the FARC in Colombia, the FMLN in El Salvador, and the ANC in South Africa, all laid down their arms when military pressure and the promise of a “peace dividend” made more attractive the invitation to compete in fair political and electoral arenas.
Federalism
Israeli settlements in the West Bank, as well as numerous anti-Palestinian Israeli policies, hinder the formation of a contiguous sovereign Palestinian state. This proposal evades such Israeli hindrances by advocating a federal government with two provinces, allowing Gaza and the West Bank to develop independently, thus preventing Israel’s veto power over West Bank progress from inhibiting Gaza’s development. Federalism also provides insulation between the dominant parties in each province.
The plan also promotes the creation in the West Bank of well-funded voluntary institutions of self-determination similar to those that pre-1948 Zionist settlers used to advance Jewish self-determination. As voluntary institutions they cannot be vetoed by Israel. Their development over a period of time, however, will create the social structures and dynamics necessary for eventual full self-determination and self-government.
This does not in any way preclude the desirability and necessity of ending Israeli occupation policies in the West Bank. This should be strenuously negotiated for. But it is crucial to acknowledge that, on the Palestinian side, this aspiration for a territorially contiguous sovereign state in the West Bank has, to a considerable extent, become a panacea for the suffering inflicted upon Palestinians by Israel. Simultaneously it has maximized resistance on the Israeli side, making progress on the ground impossible.
In negotiations concerning the status of the West Bank, the focus should shift toward dismantling the anti-Palestinian policies and practices of the occupation, creating shared governance structures, establishing normalcy, and creating the conditions for equal opportunity for Palestinians. By fostering a regime of equal treatment, both Palestinians and Israelis can transcend symbolism and improve their lives in the actual world, embarking on a path toward peace, economic prosperity, and mutual self-determination.
Once underway the self-determination process will create new power dynamics and will gradually reduce the economic power disparity between Palestine and Israel. The relative improvement of the Palestinian bargaining position, likely combined with Palestinian civil rights pressures in Israel proper, will ultimately lead to more significant concessions from Israel.
The Palestinian state, thus, will emerge in phases, starting in Gaza. While Israel may slow this process, it will not be able to prevent it.
Rebuilding and Development
A joint redevelopment agency, comprising the Transition Authority and a professional fiduciary appointed by the Participating Powers, is suggested. The Transition Authority will oversee the plan’s implementation, while the fiduciary will supervise spending and ensure transparency.
Initiating these practical activities will demonstrate that planning and implementation will proceed, regardless of Israel’s prior agreement. This will increase the confidence of stakeholders, creating a virtuous cycle of investment, momentum, employment, and dedication to the vision.
Israel’s demolition of Gaza’s urban environment inadvertently presents an opportunity for effective urban planning[2] in the context of Arab traditions and visions. Unwittingly Israel has created an opportunity to rebuild Gaza in a way analogous to the development of the Eixample in Barcelona. Rebuilt in accord with best practices (while maintaining allegiance to Arab cultural norms) will create a city that promotes pride and attracts entrepreneurs and investment.
Accountability in Gaza’s rebuilding will be crucial. The two primary concerns will be a) ensuring effective spending without corruption, and b) preventing funds from being diverted to paramilitary groups. These concerns can be mitigated by implementing the Indian “stack” ID and payments system, which bypasses middlemen and securely transfers funds directly to recipients, coincidentally promoting the development of a robust consumer market economy.
A Transition Authority, assembled by the Participating Powers, is proposed, potentially with a UN peacekeeping force, until a professional municipal police force is trained and proven effective.
The Transition Authority must value respectful treatment and active engagement with Gazan society and representatives of active and new civil society organizations. This commitment not only aligns with fundamental humanitarian principles but also serves to counter the perception that the Transition Authority merely replicates past occupation authorities, prioritizing external interests. In the initial phase, where urgent attention centers on emergency infrastructure and services, the groundwork for soliciting Gazan public opinion should be laid. This proactive approach ensures that public sentiment remains a guiding force throughout subsequent stages of the transition.
Funding commitments to rebuild and stimulate Gazan economy must be made and adhered to, contingent on meeting relevant milestones and criteria concerning Gazans.
In its first year, the Authority ideally would engage various civil society groups to advise on the design of a permanent governance structure that is legitimate in the eyes of Palestinians. A legitimation mechanism, such as a plebiscite, would be organized once security conditions allow, likely in Year Two. Clear evaluation criteria are necessary to prevent accusations of political bias and to incentivize stability while discouraging extremism.
For Gaza’s rebuilding and development, it is crucial to prioritize the professional growth of local government institutions, such as public health, education, utilities, building/zoning departments, and a port/airport authority. Such institutions, operated apolitically, will provide a flywheel effect for municipal government stability.
Self-Determination
The coalition powers may be able to negotiate for eventual full Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank, based on achievement of security milestones and measurable managerial professionalism on the part of the West Bank Palestinian provincial government. This is likely to be impossible in the short term, however.
Nevertheless, lack of full territorial sovereignty in the West Bank should not discourage Palestinian hopes for self-determination. If the parties relax the artificial total-sovereignty requirement for self-determination, a discontinuous concept of sovereignty could organically develop. With several years of confidence-building and incremental progress, an interwoven and interspersed pattern of sovereignties could emerge, maximizing self-determination for both Israelis and Palestinians without offending either group and inciting them to violence. If this occurs the eventual transition to fully sovereign Palestinian governance with protections for minority Jewish rights in the West Bank could be relatively painless.
Financial Commitments Required
Infrastructure costs are estimated below, broken into “emergency” and “future”. The Range of Magnitude cost for emergency infrastructure, some of which may be paid for through the United Nations, is $3 billion. Future infrastructure, necessary for long-term population health and economic development, is likely to be a multiple of this. The total cost of building a Barcelona-like metropole likely will exceed $100 billion over 25 years, but if the plan is successfully implemented, most of that will come in the form of private investment and tax increment financing.
The author suggests that the sponsoring states transfer a minimum of $3 billion to a trust fund for use by the Transition Authority for emergency reconstruction in Year One, and to commit to a further $10 billion over 5 years for building the future city.
[1] See Appendix II for an excerpt describing the postwar US occupation of Japan. [This link takes you to a fuller discussion of ‘soft peace’, by the author of the excerpt in Appendix II.]
[2] For satellite radar-derived maps of the destruction, see Bliss, Laura, “MapLab: Mapping Gaza’s Destruction”, Bloomberg.com, January 24, 2024,
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Daniel Wolf is a Political Scientist (Ph.D. (abd) University of California, San Diego), attorney (J.D., Harvard Law School), and serial entrepreneur. He specializes in analyzing and solving complex sociopolitical problems.
His proposed strategy for pushing Biden in the right direction may be downloaded from www.tinyurl.com/gaza-2050-campaign. The comprehensive peace plan excerpted here may be downloaded from www.tinyurl.com/gaza-2050-plan.
